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Bank Rate maintained at 3.75% - April 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee is responsible for making decisions about Bank Rate. Related links Related links Our latest decision explained Monetary Policy Report - April 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting on 29 April 2026 (PDF 0.3MB) PDF Close dialog Current Bank Rate 3.75% Next due: 18 June 2026 Published on 30 April 2026 Monetary Policy Summary, April 2026 At its meeting ending on 29 April 2026, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted by a majority of 8–1 to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%. One member voted to increase Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 4%. The conflict in the Middle East means that prospects for global energy prices are highly uncertain. Monetary policy cannot influence energy prices but will be set to ensure that the economic adjustment to them occurs in a way that achieves the 2% inflation target sustainably. The policy stance required to achieve this will depend on the scale and duration of the shock, and how it propagates through the economy. The April Monetary Policy Report sets out three scenarios that help to illustrate a range of possible outcomes for the UK economy. CPI inflation has increased to 3.3%, and is likely to be higher later this year as the effects of higher energy prices pass through. There is a risk of material second-round effects in price and wage-setting, which policy would need to lean against. But the labour market continues to loosen, and a weakening economy could contain inflationary pressures. Financial conditions have tightened since the conflict began, which will help to reduce inflation over time. Taking all the risks to the economic outlook into account, the Committee judges that it is appropriate to maintain Bank Rate at this meeting. The Committee will continue to monitor closely the situation in the Middle East and how its impact propagates through the economy. The Committee stands ready to act as necessary to ensure that CPI inflation remains on track to meet the 2% target in the medium term. Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting ending on 29 April 2026 1: Before turning to its immediate policy decision, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) discussed key economic developments and its judgements around them, as well as its views on monetary policy strategy. The latest data and analysis underpinning these topics were set out in the accompanying April 2026 Monetary Policy Report. The Committee’s discussions 2: The Committee’s discussions at this meeting focused on the economic impact of developments in the Middle East. Members distinguished between the direct, indirect and second-round effects on inflation of the continuing global energy supply shock. They also considered the role of slack in the economy in restraining medium-term inflationary pressures, and the appropriate monetary policy response in these uncertain circumstances. 3: Monetary policy could not affect global energy prices, and should generally look through the initial direct, and typically also some indirect, effects on domestic inflation from a negative energy supply shock. Monetary policy would transmit with too long a lag to impact these direct and indirect effects, but would need to lean against second-round effects in wage and price-setting that proved more persistent. 4: Some direct impacts from the recent energy supply shock were already visible, notably in higher household motor fuel prices, with CPI inflation having increased to 3.3% in March. Based on the energy futures curves in the 15 days to 22 April, Bank staff expected inflation to decline to 3.1% on average in 2026 Q2, before rising back to 3.3% in Q3. That Q3 projection was 1.4 percentage points higher than at the time of the February Monetary Policy Report. In addition to higher fuel prices, the upside news also reflected the projected increase in the Ofgem price cap that would affect household utility prices. The indirect effects of high energy prices via increased production costs were also expected to be significant, and likely to affect food prices particularly. CPI inflation was expected to rise somewhat further in Q4. 5: The Committee was attentive to the risk of second-round effects in wage and price-setting, the strength of which would depend, partly on how long energy prices remained elevated, as well as the nature of any behavioural response from households and firms. 6: Members broadly agreed that any second-round effects were likely to materialise more quickly via pricing channels than wage-setting. Agency intelligence and the DMP Survey suggested firms might look to increase some prices given compressed margins, although the extent of this would be constrained by weak demand. Household short-term inflation expectations had risen and appeared to be more sensitive to price increases relative to previous episodes. This was likely to reflect the recent experience of persistent above-target inflation following successive shocks, and the current and anticipated price increases in salient items, such as energy and food. For some members, these expectations, if sustained, could reinforce inflationary pressures through future wage bargaining as households sought to protect real incomes. 7: The MPC judged that, while there were likely to be some second-round effects, continued weakness in activity would limit the strength of these. But these effects were likely to be stronger, the larger and more persistent the rise in global energy prices. Relative to the previous energy shock in 2022, current events were occurring from a starting point of lower inflation, weaker demand, a looser labour market, and restrictive monetary policy. Wage growth had been easing towards target-consistent rates, while private sector wage settlements for 2026 had been largely completed before the shock occurred. These factors would constrain wage inflation this year, providing time to observe economic evidence. However, some members observed that higher inflation in the second half of this year could impact 2027 wage negotiations, as suggested by Agents’ contacts. Some other members saw downside risks to the outlook for demand, which could further limit second-round effects. In particular, unemployment could rise further owing to weak consumption and households increasing precautionary saving. 8: In monitoring the size and propagation of the shock, the Committee would draw upon the full range of economic data, surveys of firms and households, and intelligence from the Bank’s Agents. This monitoring would include developments in energy markets, the direct effects on UK inflation, and the extent to which firms’ adjustments to increased energy and non-energy costs were materialising through higher consumer prices relative to reduced profit margins. As it would take some time for second-round effects in wage and price-setting to become evident, members would monitor forward-looking indicators to allow timely assessments. This would include indicators of future wage growth and settlements, inflation expectations, firms’ own price expectations and the expected adjustment of firms’ margins. The Committee would also continue to monitor the impact of the shock on the real economy, including through indicators of the labour market and economic slack. 9: In light of the uncertainty about the strength of second-round effects, monetary policy would need to balance the costs of leaning too little against second-round effects against the costs of leaning against these risks too much. Energy shocks involved a trade-off between inflation and output. The Committee discussed the appropriate balance in these circumstances between returning inflation to target more slowly against risking further weakness in economic activity, and how that depended on the likely strength of second-round effects. 10: Section 3 of the April Report set out scenarios for the economy, based on different paths for energy prices and second-round effects. In Scenario A, energy prices were assumed to follow market futures curves, while in Scenarios B and C, these were higher and more persistent than the futures paths to varying degrees. There were no second-round effects from the latest energy shock in Scenario A. Second-round effects were incorporated in Scenarios B and C, and materially so in Scenario C. 11: The appropriate monetary policy response would be state-contingent. The scenarios illustrated that a more pronounced overshoot of inflation, as in Scenario C, was likely to warrant a forceful tightening in monetary policy. Given the absence of, or more modest, second-round effects in Scenarios A and B respectively, a less restrictive policy stance would be required than in Scenario C. 12: The appropriate policy response should also be robust across a range of scenarios, given the uncertainty about how the outlook would evolve. Members held different views on the likelihood of each scenario and the timing of any policy response. Some members might prefer to act early as insurance against risks to inflation persistence. Others might prefer to see more conclusive evidence of inflation persistence before acting. Such an approach might avoid unduly weighing on activity, or the risk of a subsequent policy reversal. 13: It was important to consider the appropriate policy stance in the context of financial conditions. All members noted that financial conditions had tightened materially since the onset of the conflict which would help feed through to lower inflationary pressures over time, particularly while further evidence accumulated in the coming months. 14: Looking ahead, the median expectation in the April Market Participants Survey was for Bank Rate to be maintained at its current level this year. By contrast, the market-implied path for Bank Rate in the 15 days to 22 April was upward-sloping, suggesting some increase in Bank Rate