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🇯🇵Bank of JapanJanuary 23, 2026
Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting (2026-01-23)
통화정책결정회의 의사록 (2026년 1월 23일)
Summary
일본은행이 2026년 1월 23일 통화정책결정회의에서 진행한 논의를 상세하게 정리한 의사록입니다. 정책위원별 경기·물가 인식, 통화정책 운영 방향에 대한 토론, 의장 제안 및 표결 내역이 포함됩니다. 의사록은 통상 회의 약 2개월 후에 공개됩니다.
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I. Summary of Staff Reports on Economic and Financial Developments
A. Market Operations in the Intermeeting Period
The Bank had been conducting money market operations in accordance with the guideline for money market operations decided at the previous meeting on December 18 and 19, 2025. The uncollateralized overnight call rate had been in the range of 0.727 to 0.729 percent.
Meanwhile, in December 2025, the Bank conducted Japanese government bond (JGB) purchases of about 3.3 trillion yen per month. In January 2026, it cut down the monthly purchase amount by about 400 billion yen, to about 2.9 trillion yen per month; this was in accordance with the JGB reduction plan decided at the June 2025 meeting.
B. Recent Developments in Financial Markets
In the money market, the uncollateralized overnight call rate had been at around 0.75 percent. The general collateral (GC) repo rate had been at around the same level as the uncollateralized overnight call rate. As for interest rates on term instruments, yields on three-month treasury discount bills (T-Bills) had increased slightly.
The Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) had risen significantly: while semiconductor stock prices in particular had moved in line with developments in U.S. stock prices, the index had also partly reflected expectations for future government policy in Japan. Yields on 10-year JGBs had risen significantly, mainly reflecting market views on future developments in economic activity and prices and in monetary and fiscal policies. The liquidity indicators in the JGB markets continued to improve on the whole. In the foreign exchange market, the yen had depreciated against both the U.S. dollar and the euro over the intermeeting period.
C. Overseas Economic and Financial Developments
Overseas economies had grown moderately on the whole, although some weakness had been seen in part, reflecting trade and other policies in each jurisdiction. The U.S. economy maintained solid growth on the whole, although some weakness had been seen in part. European economies continued to be relatively weak on the whole, partly reflecting that exports had seen a reactionary decline following earlier front-loading. The Chinese economy had decelerated, mainly due to the impact of tariff increases and the gradually diminishing effects of government policies, and as adjustment pressure continued in the real estate and other markets. Emerging and commodity-exporting economies other than China had improved moderately on the whole.
As for the outlook, although downward pressure stemming from the impact of trade and other policies in each jurisdiction was expected to remain for the time being, overseas economies were projected to return to a growth path, partly supported by global AI-related demand. There were high uncertainties regarding the outlook, such as the impact of trade policy in each jurisdiction, developments in global AI-related demand, and developments in the Chinese economy.
With respect to overseas financial markets, market sentiment remained at an improved level, reflecting reduced uncertainties over the outlook for the global economy. U.S. and European long-term interest rates were more or less unchanged over the intermeeting period. U.S. stock prices had risen, with concerns over valuation adjustments particularly in AI-related sectors having eased, and partly due to the impact of a rise in commodity prices. European stock prices had risen, moving in line with developments in U.S. stock prices. Meanwhile, currencies in emerging economies had appreciated overall, with some currencies appreciating on the back of economic indicators being more solid than market expectations and copper prices having risen. Crude oil prices had risen recently against the background of growing instability of the situation in Iran, after having fluctuated due to speculation over Russian and Venezuelan crude oil supplies.
D. Economic and Financial Developments in Japan
1. Economic developments
Japan's economy had recovered moderately, although some weakness had been seen in part. Regarding the outlook, the economic recovery -- particularly in exports was likely to be moderate for the time being due to the impact of trade and other policies in each jurisdiction; thereafter, however, the improving trend in the economy was likely to become more pronounced, supported by factors such as the government's economic measures and accommodative financial conditions.
Exports continued to be more or less flat as a trend, while they had been affected by the increase in U.S. tariffs. Regarding the outlook, exports were highly likely to remain somewhat slow for the time being. This was because, although solid global AI-related demand was expected to provide some support, exports were likely to be pushed down by a reactionary decline following the front-loading ahead of the U.S. tariff increase and by the adverse effects on final demand reflecting progress in the pass-through of tariff hikes to selling prices.
Industrial production continued to be more or less flat. Regarding the outlook, it was expected to remain more or less flat as a trend. This was because, although downward pressure was likely to be exerted by a reactionary decline following the front-loading of production ahead of the U.S. tariff increase and by a decrease in final demand reflecting progress in the pass-through of tariff hikes to selling prices, domestic demand was projected to be resilient, partly due to the effects of the government's economic measures.
Corporate profits remained at high levels on the whole, although downward effects due to tariffs had been seen in manufacturing, and business sentiment had been at a favorable level. In this situation, business fixed investment had been on a moderate increasing trend. With regard to the outlook, business fixed investment was likely to continue on an increasing trend, supported by moves to clear order backlogs and by labor-saving investment to address labor shortages; that said, for the time being, downward pressure was likely to be exerted on business fixed investment from a deceleration in corporate profits in manufacturing and a rise in construction costs.
Private consumption had been resilient against the background of an improvement in the employment and income situation, although it had been affected by price rises. The consumption activity index (CAI; real, travel balance-adjusted) had increased slightly for the July-September quarter of 2025, and continued to increase on average for the October-November period, relative to that quarter, mainly for durable goods, such as automobiles and household electrical appliances. Based on anecdotal information from firms, statistics published by industry organizations, and high-frequency indicators, private consumption since December seemed to have declined slightly from the previous month. Consumer sentiment had seen a clear improvement recently, mainly on the back of a decline in the rate of increase in food prices and the rise in stock prices; more recently, however, it had been affected by concerns over a decline in inbound tourism demand due to the Chinese government's request for its citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan. Regarding the outlook, despite being under downward pressure stemming from elevated food prices, private consumption was expected to remain resilient, supported by a rise in employee income and by the government's measures to reduce the household burden of higher energy prices.
The employment and income situation had improved moderately. The number of employed persons continued to increase steadily, mainly for regular employees. Nominal wages per employee continued to increase steadily, albeit with fluctuations. With regard to the outlook, employee income was likely to continue to see a steady increase at its current pace for the time being, albeit with fluctuations.
As for prices, in international commodity markets, crude oil prices had been on a declining trend, albeit with fluctuations, while copper prices had seen a clear increase. Meanwhile, market prices of food had declined moderately. The year-on-year rate of increase in the producer price index (PPI) had been on a decelerating trend, mainly due to the decline in crude oil prices, and had been at around 2.5 percent recently. The year-on-year rate of increase in the services producer price index (SPPI, excluding international transportation) had been on a decelerating trend, being in the range of 2.5-3.0 percent recently, primarily because the impact of the price hikes seen in 2024 had dissipated, although the rate itself remained relatively high, mainly on the back of a rise in personnel expenses. With moves to pass on wage increases to selling prices continuing, the year-on-year rate of increase in the consumer price index (CPI, all items less fresh food) had been at around 2.5 percent recently, due to the effects of the rise in food prices, such as rice prices, and other factors. Inflation expectations had risen moderately. With regard to the outlook, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI was likely to decelerate to a level below 2 percent in the first half of 2026, with the waning of the effects of the rise in food prices, such as rice prices, and pushed down by a decline in energy prices reflecting the government's measures to reduce the household burden of higher energy prices.
2. Financial environment
Japan's financial conditions had been accommodative.
Real interest rates had been negative. Firms' funding costs had increased. Firms' demand for funds had increased moderately on the back of, for example, the recovery in economic activity as well as mergers and acquisitions of firms. With regard to credit supply, financial institutions' lending attitudes as perceived by firms had been accommodative.
Issuance conditions for CP and corporate bonds had been favorable. In this situation, the year-on-year rate of increase in the amount outstanding of bank lending had been in the range of 4.5-5.0 percent; that in the aggregate amount outstanding of CP and corporate bonds had been in the range of 6.5-7.0 percent. Firms' financial positions had been favorable. The number of bankruptcies of firms had been more or less flat.
Meanwhile, the year-on-year rate of change in the money stock had been in the range of 1.5-2.0 percent.
3. Financial system
Japan's financial system maintained stability on the whole.
Profits of major banks had increased, owing in particular to a rise in net interest income, mainly composed of interest on domestic loans. Meanwhile, their credit costs had been at low levels. Their capital adequacy ratios remained sufficiently above the regulatory requirements.
Profits of regional banks had increased, mainly on the back of the rise in net interest income. Meanwhile, their credit costs had been at low levels. Their capital adequacy ratios remained sufficiently above the regulatory requirements.
With regard to the financial cycle, of the 14 Financial Activity Indexes (FAIXs) that comprise the heat map in the Financial System Report, 13 showed no significant deviation from the trends. Regarding the financial gap, the positive gap remained narrower than a while ago, and no major financial imbalances had been seen in current financial activities. However, attention continued to be warranted on developments in asset prices, such as real estate and stock prices, and it was necessary to continue paying close attention to whether financial activities would not significantly deviate from real economic activity. In addition, it was necessary to carefully monitor the impact that factors such as the trade policy in each jurisdiction, geopolitical risks, and developments in the foreign non-bank financial intermediary (NBFI) sector had on the financial system through various channels.
II. Summary of Discussions by the Policy Board on Economic and Financial Developments and the January 2026 Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices
A. Current Situation of Economic Activity and Prices
With regard to global financial and capital markets, members shared the view that market sentiment remained at an improved level, reflecting reduced uncertainties over the outlook for the global economy. As background to the fact that stock prices had been renewing historical highs in many economies after the turn of 2026, one member pointed out that expectations of economic recovery had heightened rapidly due to support from both the monetary and the fiscal sides in each economy and to an expansion in investment reflecting the global IT boom.
Members shared the recognition that overseas economies had grown moderately on the whole, although some weakness had been seen in part, reflecting trade and other policies in each jurisdiction. Many members pointed out that the global economy was highly likely to remain solid, considering the decline in uncertainty regarding the effects of trade policies, the expansion in AI-related demand, and other factors. One of these members expressed the recognition that, considering also that accommodative policies had been adopted around the world, on both the monetary and the fiscal front, the global economy was expected to go through a shifting phase in 2026, where momentum toward recovery starts to operate.
Members agreed that the U.S. economy maintained solid growth on the whole, although some weakness had been seen in part. Some members expressed the view that, with the impact of tariff policies remaining limited on the whole, the economy had been solid against the background of an increase in AI-related investment and an expansion in consumption by the wealthy on the back of high stock prices. One of these members pointed out that motor vehicle sales for the past two months had exceeded market expectations, recovering from the decline following the ending of subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles, and that this served as evidence of solid consumption. In addition, a few members said that fiscal measures, such as income tax cuts, and deregulation were also expected to boost economic activity. Meanwhile, one member expressed the view that, while IT-related business fixed investment, particularly that related to AI, had led to the solidity in the U.S. economy, uncertainties remained about, for example, risks surrounding employment and the direction of monetary policy given these risks. A different member stated that the impact on consumer prices in the United States of the price pass-through of tariff hikes could begin to be pronounced, and it was therefore necessary to carefully monitor price-related data.
Members shared the view that European economies continued to be relatively weak on the whole, partly reflecting that exports had seen a reactionary decline following earlier front-loading. One member expressed the recognition that, while the economies continued to pick up moderately on the whole, supported by policy interest rate cuts by the European Central Bank, there had been disparities between individual economies, as seen in, for example, the somewhat sluggish German economy and solid southern European economies.
Members shared the view that the Chinese economy had decelerated, mainly due to the impact of tariff increases and the gradually diminishing effects of government policies, and as adjustment pressure continued in the real estate and other markets. One member expressed the recognition that, although deflationary pressure stemming from a real estate downturn remained, the possibility of a sharp deterioration in the economy was low, as the government's policy measures had provided support.
Members shared the recognition that emerging and commodity-exporting economies other than China had improved moderately on the whole.
Members agreed that financial conditions in Japan had been accommodative. Some members noted that real interest rates in the short- to medium-term zone, on which monetary policy has a large effect, remained significantly low, and that accommodative financial conditions were maintained. In addition, some members expressed the recognition that, while not much time had passed since the policy interest rate hike in December 2025, financial conditions continued to be accommodative, considering factors such as firms' and other entities' demand for funds, financial institutions' lending attitudes, and issuance conditions for CP and corporate bonds. Regarding bank lending, one member expressed the view that, while interest rates on market rate-linked loans had risen and many financial institutions had announced plans to increase short-term prime rates and interest rates on ordinary deposits from February 2026, financial institutions' lending attitudes had been active and firms' financial positions remained favorable so far, even under these circumstances. One member pointed out that the recent high growth in bank lending was attributable to an increase in firms' appetite for investment, aiming for higher growth. In relation to this, a different member expressed the view that, as far as recent developments in lending suggested, interest payments on short- to medium-term borrowings for fixed investment funds and working capital could be covered by favorable corporate profits and increased production and sales.
Based on the above deliberations on economic and financial conditions abroad and financial conditions in Japan, members discussed the state of Japan's economic activity and prices.
With regard to economic activity, members shared the recognition that Japan's economy had recovered moderately, although some weakness had been seen in part. Many members expressed the recognition that, although the effects of tariff increases continued to be observed on the export side, domestic demand, such as business fixed investment and private consumption, had been resilient. One member noted that, since around autumn 2025, it had gradually become clear that the impact of tariff policies on Japan's economy remained small relative to initial expectations. In addition, the member pointed out that, based on reports presented at the meeting of the general managers of the Bank's branches, AI-related demand in Japan had been diverse, including air-conditioning systems for data centers and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and AI-related demand had extended across regions and industries to a greater extent than expected. This member then expressed the view that the benefits of the expansion in demand had reached not only direct exporters but also their subcontractors.
Members concurred that exports and industrial production continued to be more or less flat as a trend, while they had been affected by the increase in U.S. tariffs. With regard to inbound tourism demand, which accounts for about a quarter of services exports, one member expressed the recognition that, although the number of visitors to Japan from China had declined due to the impact of the Chinese government's request for its citizens to refrain from travelling to Japan, the impact on inbound tourism demand as a whole had so far been limited, owing to an increase in the number of visitors from other Asian economies.
Members shared the recognition that business fixed investment had been on a moderate increasing trend, with corporate profits remaining at high levels on the whole, despite being affected by tariff policies, and with business sentiment being at a favorable level. A few members commented that business fixed investment had been solid, partly supported by the global AI boom, and firms' demand for funds had increased.
Members concurred that private consumption had been resilient against the background of the improvement in the employment and income situation, although it had been affected by price rises. Some members expressed the recognition that, while consumption of nondurable goods remained somewhat weak due to the rise in food prices, it could be assessed that overall consumption had been resilient. One member added that the weakness in nondurable goods consumption could also be attributed to factors such as demographic developments and changes in consumption preferences. The member continued that some portion of household spending had been shifting from goods consumption to services consumption. A different member pointed out that, while the increase in food prices had pushed down consumption until recently, since the rate of increase in food prices had been gradually slowing, private consumption had picked up moderately. Meanwhile, one member said that the rise in real estate prices in recent years could be increasing non-homeowners' concerns about the future, thereby pushing down private consumption.
Members shared the view that the employment and income situation had improved moderately. One member noted that steady progress in wage growth could be confirmed from various aspects, considering factors such as the outlook regarding the 2026 annual spring labor-management wage negotiations, solid winter bonuses of major firms, and an increase in the proportion of job changers whose wages had risen. One member expressed the recognition that, while the yen's depreciation pushes up the profits and wages of large firms, it pushes down those of small and medium-sized firms. The member continued that attention was thus warranted on the possibility that this, coupled with the yen's depreciation pushing up prices, would lead to wider inequality.
As for prices, members agreed that, with moves to pass on wage increases to selling prices continuing, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI (all items less fresh food) had been at around 2.5 percent recently, due to the effects of the rise in food prices, such as rice prices, and other factors. One member noted that there had been signs of cost-push inflation easing; as background to this, the member pointed out that price hikes as a result of firms' efforts to make up for past increases in import prices, which had been seen in food prices in particular, had been mostly completed. One member pointed out that the rise in rice prices was triggered by supply shortages, but with the addition of demand factors during the procurement of rice harvested in autumn 2025, it was possible that the rise in prices was a result of a combination of multiple factors. On this basis, the member said that close attention continued to be warranted on whether price rises that could not be explained simply by cost-push factors emerged in other goods. A different member pointed out that, in areas such as food and energy, where there was little room to absorb increasing costs in the intermediate demand stage and a rise in import prices was significant, cost increases over the past few years had been passed on to the CPI. The member continued that, however, as such developments had led to households saving on other items, given their lack of financial leeway, the pass-through of personnel expenses to prices had so far been moderate for prices such as services prices, excluding dining-out and accommodations. A different member pointed out that services prices continued to grow at a rate in the range of 2.5-3.0 percent when excluding public services and housing rent. The member then expressed the view that, although there had recently been moves to implement a de facto price increase by lowering the quality of services, it was likely that room for making such adjustments in quality would become smaller and moves to raise prices would in turn become widespread. With these developments in mind, this member expressed the recognition that the main driver of price rises had shifted from raw material prices to personnel expenses, and inflation had started to become stickier. In addition, one member pointed out that housing rent had risen, mainly in urban areas. The member then expressed the view that this was partly due to an increase in demand for rental housing, as there had been some postponements of home purchases due to housing prices being pushed up by the rise in material prices, reflecting inflation overseas and the yen's depreciation, and by the rise in personnel expenses. Meanwhile, members concurred that inflation expectations had risen moderately. A few members pointed out that, with the ongoing shift from the deflationary norm, many of the indicators for inflation expectations, including the BEI (break-even inflation) rate, which shows market participants' inflation expectations, had been rising toward 2 percent. One of these members added that the recent depreciation of the yen and the effects of fiscal policy had also contributed to the rise in inflation expectations. Noting that the views of economic entities, specifically firms and households, should be given due weight when assessing inflation expectations, a different member expressed the view that the inflation expectations of firms and households had reached approximately 2 percent.
B. Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices
In formulating the January 2026 Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (Outlook Report), members discussed the baseline scenario of the outlook for Japan's economic activity. They shared the recognition that Japan's economy was likely to continue growing moderately, with overseas economies returning to a growth path, and as a virtuous cycle from income to spending gradually intensified, supported by factors such as the government's economic measures and accommodative financial conditions, while the economy was projected to be affected by trade and other policies in each jurisdiction.
Many members expressed the recognition that, in addition to the decline in uncertainties regarding the U.S. economy and the impact of tariff policies, the government's economic measures were likely to push up the economy. In relation to this, one member expressed the view that, in examining the effects of fiscal spending, it was necessary to take into account factors such as the degree of import inducement and the spending propensity of households and firms. The member continued that the size of the effects of fiscal spending was theoretically different between periods of economic expansion and recession. One member pointed out that, in projecting the outlook for Japan's economy, it was also important to consider aspects such as the extent to which AI-related investment would expand with a sense of labor shortage continuing to be strong, and the extent to which macroeconomic productivity would be pushed up through corporate activities such as business succession and mergers and acquisitions.
Members shared the recognition that, although downward pressure stemming from the impact of tariff increases was expected to remain for the time being, Japan's exports and industrial production were likely to recover moderately as overseas economies returned to a growth path, partly supported by global AI-related demand.
Members shared the recognition that, supported in part by the government's economic measures and accommodative financial conditions, business fixed investment was likely to remain on an increasing trend, including labor-saving and digital-related investment to address labor shortages, and research and development (R&D) investment.
Members agreed that, although private consumption was expected to be more or less flat for the time being due to the remaining impact of price rises, it was projected to gradually return to a moderate increasing trend, with a continued rise in employee income. One member pointed out that, in addition to the past rise in food prices, housing rent had risen recently, mainly in urban areas. The member then stated that, while measures had been taken by national and local governments, developments in food prices and housing rent should be monitored carefully, given that they significantly affect the sense of economic well-being among households and their consumption behavior.
Members shared the recognition that employee income was likely to continue to see a steady increase at its current pace for the time being, albeit with fluctuations. They shared the view that, thereafter, the growth momentum in employee income was likely to increase somewhat, as the nominal wage growth rate was expected to accelerate again in reflection of the recovery in corporate profits. Many members expressed the view that, with labor market conditions continuing to be tight, the mechanism in which wages and prices rise moderately in interaction with each other had been taking hold in Japan, and that a wide range of firms would continue to raise wages steadily in the 2026 annual spring labor-management wage negotiations, following the solid wage increases in 2025. One of these members expressed the recognition that, while it was highly likely that the upward momentum in nominal wages would be maintained, the rate of increase in energy and food prices was expected to decline gradually, and that in the CPI was also likely to decline. The member continued that it was therefore projected that the rate of change in real wages would finally turn positive and remain so.
Based on these discussions, members shared the recognition that, comparing the projections with those in the October 2025 Outlook Report, the projected real GDP growth rates for fiscal 2025 and 2026 were somewhat higher, with the former due to higher-than-expected growth in overseas economies and the impact of the statistical revision to the GDP figures, and the latter mainly reflecting the effects of the government's economic measures. They continued that the rate for fiscal 2027, on the other hand, was somewhat lower due to the dissipation of the effects of the government's economic measures.
Members then discussed the baseline scenario of the outlook for Japan's price development