Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting (2025-12-19)

다음은 PDF에서 추출한 본문 텍스트입니다. The Bank had been conducting money market operations in accordance with the guideline for money market operations decided at the previous meeting on October 29 and 30, 2025. The uncollateralized overnight call rate had been in the range of 0.476 to 0.482 percent. Meanwhile, the Bank had conducted Japanese government bond (JGB) purchases of about 3.3 trillion yen per month in accordance with the JGB reduction plan decided at the June 2025 meeting. In the money market, the uncollateralized overnight call rate had been at around 0.5 percent. The general collateral (GC) repo rate had been at around the same level as the uncollateralized overnight call rate. As for interest rates on term instruments, yields on three-month treasury discount bills (T-Bills) had increased. The Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) had risen over the intermeeting period on the back of solid corporate results, although it had declined temporarily in line with adjustments in U.S. stock prices. Yields on 10-year JGBs had risen significantly, mainly reflecting market views on future developments in economic activity and prices. The liquidity indicators in the JGB markets continued to improve on the whole. In the foreign exchange market, the yen had depreciated against both the U.S. dollar and the euro over the intermeeting period. Overseas economies had grown moderately on the whole, although some weakness had been seen in part, reflecting trade and other policies in each jurisdiction. The U.S. economy maintained solid growth on the whole, although some weakness had been seen in part. European economies continued to be relatively weak on the whole, partly reflecting that exports had seen a reactionary decline following earlier front-loading. The Chinese economy had decelerated, mainly due to the impact of tariff increases and the gradually diminishing effects of government policies, and as adjustment pressure continued in the real estate and other markets. Emerging and commodity-exporting economies other than China had improved moderately on the whole. As for the outlook, although trade and other policies in each jurisdiction were expected to lead to some slowdown in overseas economies, these economies were projected to see a gradual acceleration in their growth rate thereafter, and then return to a growth path. There were high uncertainties regarding the outlook, such as the impact of trade policy in each jurisdiction, developments in global AI-related demand, and developments in the Chinese economy. With respect to overseas financial markets, despite continued attention to uncertainties over the global economy, market sentiment remained at an improved level. U.S. long-term interest rates were more or less unchanged over the intermeeting period; they had temporarily declined, as market expectations of policy interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve had increased, but had subsequently risen, as attention had been drawn to, for example, a possible increase in the issuance of U.S. Treasury securities. European long-term interest rates had risen, mainly because market expectations of policy interest rate cuts by the European Central Bank had subsided. U.S. stock prices were more or less unchanged over the intermeeting period; they had temporarily declined due to factors such as valuation adjustments particularly in AI-related sectors, but had subsequently risen, mainly reflecting increased market expectations of policy interest rate cuts. European stock prices were more or less unchanged over the intermeeting period, moving in line with U.S. stock prices. Meanwhile, currencies in emerging economies had been more or less flat on the whole. Crude oil prices had declined, due to prospects of an easing of supply and demand conditions on the back of, for example, an increase in oil production by OPEC Plus. Japan's economy had recovered moderately, although some weakness had been seen in part. Regarding the outlook, economic growth was likely to be moderate as trade and other policies in each jurisdiction led to some slowdown in overseas economies and to a decline in domestic corporate profits and other factors, although factors such as accommodative financial conditions were expected to provide support. Exports continued to be more or less flat as a trend, while they had been affected by the increase in U.S. tariffs. Regarding the outlook, exports were highly likely to remain somewhat decelerated for the time being. This was because, although solid global AI-related demand was expected to provide some support, a reactionary decline following the front-loading due to the increase in U.S. tariffs and a decrease in final demand due to progress in the pass-through of tariff hikes to selling prices were likely to push down exports. Industrial production continued to be more or less flat. Regarding the outlook, although a reactionary decline following the front-loading due to the increase in U.S. tariffs and the effects of the slowdown in overseas economies were expected to exert downward pressure, industrial production was likely to remain more or less flat as a trend, as domestic demand was expected to be resilient, partly due to the effects of the government's economic measures. Corporate profits remained at high levels on the whole, although downward effects due to tariffs had been seen in manufacturing, and business sentiment had been at a favorable level. In this situation, business fixed investment had been on a moderate increasing trend. With regard to the outlook, business fixed investment was likely to continue on an increasing trend, supported by moves to clear order backlogs and by labor-saving investment to address labor shortages; that said, a slowdown in growth momentum in business fixed investment was highly likely to continue for a while against the background of slower growth in corporate profits and rising construction costs. Private consumption had been resilient against the background of an improvement in the employment and income situation, although it had been affected by price rises. The consumption activity index (CAI; real, travel balance adjusted) had increased slightly for the July-September quarter of 2025 on a quarter-on-quarter basis. It had then increased for October, relative to that quarter, mainly due to an increase in durable goods such as automobiles and household appliances. Based on anecdotal information from firms, statistics published by industry organizations, and high-frequency indicators, private consumption since November seemed to have declined slightly from the previous month. Consumer sentiment had seen a clear improvement recently, mainly on the back of a decline in the rate of increase in food prices and the rise in stock prices. Regarding the outlook, although wage increases and the government's measures to reduce the household burden of higher energy prices were expected to provide some support, private consumption was highly likely to remain more or less flat for a while, since elevated food prices would push down consumption. The employment and income situation had improved moderately. The number of employed persons continued to increase steadily, mainly for regular employees. Nominal wages per employee continued to increase steadily. With regard to the outlook, employee income was likely to continue to see a steady increase for the time being, albeit with fluctuations due to factors such as winter bonus payments, and minimum wage revisions being moved back to a later date than in 2024. As for prices, in international commodity markets, crude oil prices had been on a moderate declining trend, albeit with fluctuations, while copper prices had seen a clear increase. Meanwhile, market prices of food had declined somewhat recently. The year-on-year rate of increase in the producer price index (PPI) had followed a decelerating trend, mainly due to the decline in crude oil prices, and had recently been in the range of 2.5-3.0 percent. The year-on-year rate of increase in the services producer price index (SPPI, excluding international transportation) had been on a decelerating trend, being in the range of 2.5-3.0 percent recently, primarily because the impact of the price hikes in 2024 had dissipated, although the rate itself remained relatively high, mainly on the back of a rise in personnel expenses. With moves to pass on wage increases to selling prices continuing, the year-on-year rate of increase in the consumer price index (CPI, all items less fresh food) had been at around 3 percent recently, due to the effects of the rise in food prices, such as rice prices, and other factors. Inflation expectations had risen moderately. With regard to the outlook, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI was expected to decelerate toward the end of fiscal 2025, as the effects of the rise in food prices, such as rice prices, were likely to wane and as the government's measures to reduce the household burden of higher energy prices were expected to exert downward pressure. Japan's financial conditions had been accommodative. Real interest rates had been negative. Firms' funding costs had increased. Firms' demand for funds had increased moderately on the back of, for example, the recovery in economic activity as well as mergers and acquisitions of firms. With regard to credit supply, financial institutions' lending attitudes as perceived by firms had been accommodative. Issuance conditions for CP and corporate bonds had been favorable. In this situation, the year-on-year rate of increase in the amount outstanding of bank lending had been at around 4.5 percent; that in the aggregate amount outstanding of CP and corporate bonds had been at around 7.5 percent. Firms' financial positions had been favorable. The number of bankruptcies of firms had been more or less flat. Meanwhile, the year-on-year rate of change in the money stock had been in the range of 1.5-2.0 percent. With regard to global financial and capital markets, members shared the view that, despite continued attention to uncertainties over the global economy, market sentiment remained at an improved level. Many members noted that stock prices had been at high levels on a global basis, especially in the United States. These members continued that this was mainly because uncertainties regarding trade and other policies in each jurisdiction were diminishing, and because there were expectations for high-tech related firms to perform well, as AI-related demand continued to expand. In relation to AI, one of these members pointed out that attention was warranted on the possibility that if revenue did not increase in line with investment, this could bring about adjustments in stock prices, particularly for firms with weak financial bases. Members shared the recognition that overseas economies had grown moderately on the whole, although some weakness had been seen in part, reflecting trade and other policies in each jurisdiction. As for the outlook, they concurred that, although trade and other policies in each jurisdiction were expected to lead to some slowdown in overseas economies, these economies were projected to see a gradual acceleration in their growth rate thereafter, and then return to a growth path. Some members pointed out that it had become less likely that overseas economies would see a pronounced slowdown from 2026 onward, considering the decline in uncertainty regarding the effects of trade policies, the expansion in AI-related demand, and other factors. One member said that the current phase was similar to the period when economic stimulus measures from both monetary and fiscal sides had been adopted simultaneously around the world during the COVID-19 pandemic due to a global sense of risk. The member continued that, as in that period, the alignment of global policy cycles was expected to lead to higher economic growth and prices worldwide. Members agreed that the U.S. economy maintained solid growth on the whole, although some weakness had been seen in part. Many members noted that, (1) with the pass-through of tariff costs to selling prices remaining only moderate, private consumption had been solid, partly due to the wealth effects stemming from high stock prices; and (2) business fixed investment had increased, reflecting the expansion in AI-related demand. On this basis, these members expressed the recognition that, while there were still factors to consider, such as developments in the labor market, uncertainty regarding the U.S. economy had decreased. In relation to AI, one of these members expressed the view that, although it was necessary to be cautious about markets' optimism, it was highly likely that business fixed investment would continue to be firm in 2026, with big tech firms in particular currently making fixed investment based on their medium-term plans. Noting that the impact on consumers of the rise in tariff costs was still unfolding, one member expressed the recognition that attention continued to be warranted on the possibility that employment in the United States would be affected by, for example, the burden on domestic firms and uncertainties regarding future developments in private consumption. In relation to this, a different member commented that if the impact of price rises expanded, measures such as removing or reducing tariffs could be taken, with the 2026 midterm elections in view, as had already been the case with some food items. Another member pointed out that the negative impact of tariffs might not materialize, due to upward pressure on the economy from tax cuts and deregulation. Meanwhile, a few members noted that, recently in the U.S. economy, there had been growing disparities in private consumption across income groups and a significant gap between fixed investment by IT-related firms and that by firms in other industries. These members then stated that it was necessary to carefully examine the impact of these factors on future economic developments. Members shared the recognition that European economies continued to be relatively weak on the whole, partly reflecting that exports had seen a reactionary decline following earlier front-loading. Members shared the view that the Chinese economy had decelerated, mainly due to the impact of tariff increases and the gradually diminishing effects of government policies, and as adjustment pressure continued in the real estate and other markets. Members shared the recognition that emerging and commodity-exporting economies other than China had improved moderately on the whole. Based on the above deliberations on economic and financial conditions abroad, members discussed the state of Japan's economy. With regard to economic activity, members shared the view that Japan's economy had recovered moderately, although some weakness had been seen in part. With regard to the impact of U.S. tariff policy, many members expressed the recognition that although there had been downward pressure on corporate profits, mainly in manufacturing, there were no signs that the effects had spread to Japan's economy as a whole, including business fixed investment and employment and wage developments. A few members pointed out that real GDP for the July-September quarter of 2025 had recorded negative growth for the first time in six quarters. These members continued that this, however, largely reflected the impact of a reactionary decline following the front-loading of exports seen in early spring 2025 due to the increase in tariffs, and it was expected that the negative growth would be only temporary. As for the outlook for economic activity, members shared the recognition that, (1) Japan's economic growth was likely to be moderate as trade and other policies in each jurisdiction led to some slowdown in overseas economies and to a decline in domestic corporate profits and other factors, although factors such as accommodative financial conditions were expected to provide support; and (2) thereafter, Japan's economic growth rate was likely to rise, with overseas economies returning to a growth path. Some members pointed out that, with uncertainties regarding the U.S. economy and the impact of tariff policies declining, uncertainty surrounding the outlook for corporate profits was gradually diminishing, as suggested by the slight upward revision in the forecast for corporate profits, including in manufacturing, for fiscal 2025 in the December 2025 Tankan (Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan) from the forecast in the September Tankan. On this basis, many members expressed the view that, considering that, for example, the effects of the government's economic measures would emerge, Japan's economy was less likely to enter the phase of "modest" growth that had previously been expected. One of these members said that the government's economic measures were likely to push up the economy for the next year or two, and might alleviate the temporary sluggishness in economic growth to some degree. In relation to this, a different member noted that, in considering the effects of fiscal policy, it was important to analyze not only the government's recent economic measures but also the size and content of the overall budget. The member continued that it was necessary to discuss these factors thoroughly in preparation for formulating the January 2026 Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (Outlook Report). Members shared the recognition that exports and industrial production continued to be more or less flat as a trend, while they had been affected by the increase in U.S. tariffs. One member expressed the recognition that IT-related exports had been on an uptrend, given that the global cycle for IT-related goods such as personal computers and smartphones had been on an expansionary phase, along with favorable global AI-related demand. The member continued that there had been no weakening in exports, which had been a concern at the time of the introduction of tariff policies. Meanwhile, with respect to services exports, a few members noted that attention was warranted on the possibility of inbound tourism demand being pushed down due to a decline in the number of visitors to Japan from China. Members shared the recognition that business fixed investment had been on a moderate increasing trend, with corporate profits remaining at high levels on the whole, despite being affected by tariff policies, and with business sentiment being at a favorable level. Some members noted that it was confirmed in the December Tankan that the growth momentum in business fixed investment was maintained even amid some lingering uncertainty regarding tariff policies. These members then pointed out that this reflected solid demand for labor-saving investment to make up for labor shortages. One of these members -- noting that many regional firms had expressed the view that labor-saving investment to address labor shortages had pushed up their business fixed investment -- expressed the recognition that labor-saving investment represented progress toward solving issues and contributed to economic growth. Meanwhile, a different member expressed the view that the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry showed that business fixed investment by small and medium-sized firms had been somewhat weak relative to other firms, and that this could be attributed to some extent to high material prices and labor shortages. Members concurred that private consumption had been resilient against the background of the improvement in the employment and income situation, although it had been affected by price rises. One member noted that, by item, while consumption of high-end products had been solid, cautiousness had been observed in consumption of nondurable goods, such as food and clothes. On this point, a few members expressed the view that consumer sentiment had improved recently, due in part to a decline in the rate of increase in food prices; if this trend continued, factors pushing down private consumption were highly likely to ease on the whole. Members shared the view that the employment and income situation had improved moderately. Many members pointed out that labor market conditions continued to be tight, and corporate profits were expected to remain at high levels on the whole, even after taking into account the impact of tariff policies. These members then expressed the recognition that, considering factors such as the stances of labor and management on the annual spring labor-management wage negotiations and anecdotal information gathered through the Bank's Head Office and branches, it was highly likely that firms would continue to raise wages steadily in 2026. One of these members expressed the view that wage hikes in 2026 at large firms with labor unions were likely to be at least around the same level as 2025, mainly reflecting relatively high price increases, solid corporate profits, and continued labor shortages. A few members pointed out that, with respect to automakers, where the impact of tariff policies was relatively significant, the yen had been depreciating compared with predicted exchange rates, and tariff costs had been gradually passed on to local selling prices in the export destinations. These members continued that, given such developments, concern that the automobile industry would adversely affect the momentum in wage hikes in the annual spring labor-management wage negotiations had abated considerably. A different member noted that, with corporate profits remaining at high levels on the whole, the results of private surveys revealed that winter bonuses for 2025 had exceeded 1 million yen per employee. The member then expressed the recognition that it was highly likely that firms would continue to raise wages steadily, including in the 2026 annual spring labor-management wage negotiations. In light of these wage developments, some members pointed out that, if the effects of the rise in food prices waned, real wages could be expected to turn positive. One of these members expressed the view that, while the rate of increase in the CPI was likely to decline gradually through the base effects, the upward momentum in nominal wages seen thus far was expected to be maintained toward the annual spring labor-management wage negotiations for fiscal 2026. The member continued that it was therefore likely that the rate of increase in real wages would rise into positive territory in the first half of 2026, and this positive trend would take hold. As for prices, members agreed that, with moves to pass on wage increases to selling prices continuing, the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI (all items less fresh food) had been at around 3 percent recently, due to the effects of the rise in food prices, such as rice prices, and other factors. In addition, they concurred that inflation expectations had risen moderately. Many members expressed the recognition that price developments since the previous meeting had been somewhat higher than the Bank's outlook in the October 2025 Outlook Report, mainly owing to the price of rice harvested in autumn 2025 remaining high. One member noted that the recent rise in food prices reflected not only temporary supply-side factors but also, to some extent, the rise in personnel expenses and in distribution costs. One member expressed the recognition that, in examining price developments, attention should be paid to, for example, firms' stance on price hikes and to consumer purchasing behavior, as prices continued to increase by over 5 percent on a year-on-year basis, even in food items other than those related to rice, due to factors such as firms' active price-setting behavior. Meanwhile, a few members mentioned recent developments in housing rent. One member pointed out that the Housing and Land Survey showed that the annualized rate of increase in housing rent had been at around 2 percent during the period from 2018 to 2023, indicating a discrepancy from that for private housing rent in the CPI, which had been at around 0 percent. The member then expressed the view that, in fact, the year-on-year rate of increase in consumer prices might be somewhat high, given the weight of private housing rent in the CPI. With regard to the outlook for prices, most members shared the recognition that (1) the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI (all items less fresh food) was likely to decelerate to a level below 2 percent through the first half of fiscal 2026, with the waning of the effects of the rise in food prices, such as rice prices, and partly due to the effects of government measures to address rising prices; and (2) thereafter, since it was projected that a sense of labor shortage would grow as the economic growth rate rises and that medium- to long-term inflation expectations would rise, it was expected that underlying CPI inflation and the rate of increase in the CPI (all items less fresh food) would increase gradually and, in the second half of the projection period of the October 2025 Outlook Report, be at a level that was generally consistent with the price stability target. One member expressed the view that the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI (all items less fresh food) was projected to be temporarily below 2 percent, mainly because of subsiding food price inflation and the effects of government measures to address rising prices. The member continued that, nevertheless, underlying CPI inflation, which was more significant in the conduct of monetary policy, was likely to continue to see a moderate rise, particularly in prices that were affected by developments in personnel expenses, as long as the momentum for wage hikes was maintained. One member stated that most food price hikes in 2025 were the result of firms' efforts to make up for past cost increases, and that these efforts had been mostly completed recently. The member then expressed the recognition that price rises were likely to become stickier due to developments in personnel expenses. On this basis, the member expressed the view that, as it was expected that the upward momentum in wages would be maintained and that the rate of increase in real wages would rise into positive territory in the first half of 2026, the underlying trend in prices was likely to continue to rise steadily toward 2 percent, even with the year-on-year rate of increase in the observed CPI decelerating. A different member expressed the recognition that Japan's economic growth being modest was no longer the baseline scenario, and this had reduced the possibility that the underlying trend in prices would become sluggish. Another member noted that it was expected that the government's economic policy and measures to address rising prices -- depending on the scale of their actual effects and the speed at which they emerged would boost consumption and appetite for investment, thereby strengthening the upward momentum of the economy and medium- to long-term inflation. Meanwhile, one member said that it was possible that households' perceived inflation could ease if prices of certain goods that could affect people's inflation expectations declined due to the government measures to address rising prices. The member continued that, as for the outlook for prices, it was also necessary to monitor the pass-through of exchange rates to prices and developments in energy prices. In addition, a different member expressed the recognition that it was highly likely that it could be judged in spring 2026, when wage hikes could be expected to be at a level in line with the price stability target for the third consecutive year, that the underlying trend in prices had reached 2 percent. Moreover, one member expressed the recognition that the level of the rate of increase in the CPI, including underlying CPI inflation, already had generally reached the price stability target, given that, for example, wage increases had been anchored and inflation expectations had risen. Members agreed that risks to economic activity and prices included developments in overseas economic activity and prices under the impact of trade and other policies in each jurisdiction, wage- and price-setting behavior of firms, and developments in financial and foreign exchange markets, and it was necessary to pay due attention to the impact of these risks on Japan's economic activity and prices. One member expressed the view that, while downside risks to the global economy remained high, the risk concerning the impact of U.S. tariff policy could no longer be described as unprecedentedly high as previously feared. A different member pointed out that the December Tankan showed that business sentiment had not been weak, including among small and medium-sized firms in the automobile-related industry. The member then expressed the recognition that downside risks to the outlook stemming from the effects of U.S. trade policy had decreased. Based on these discussions, members shared the recognition that, while uncertainties remained regarding the impact of trade policy in each jurisdiction, these uncertainties had declined. Meanwhile, one member noted that if overseas economies were to decelerate more than expected in 2026, the main reasons would likely be a dissipation of markets' optimism about the AI boom and adjustments in the private credit market, rather than the impact of trade policies. Regarding risks to prices, some members expressed the recognition that, with firms' behavior shifting more toward raising wages and prices, the yen's depreciation would more likely push up prices through factors such as rising import prices. In relation to this, some members added that rising import prices could affect underlying inflation through changes in inflation expectations, given that, for example, the norm that wages and prices do not increase easily had a